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On December 26, 2004, the Indian Ocean Tsunami triggered by an earthquake, with the epicenter off Northern Sumatra (Aceh), swept coastal areas from Indonesia to Kenya. It caused serious damage to the environment and to humans. There were 230,000 deaths, 45,752 missing, 125,000 injured, and 1,690,000 displaced people among 14 countries. 1 
The Thailand, Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (DDPM), Ministry of Interior reported 5,078 deaths, 8,457 injured and 3,716 missing among six Andaman coastal provinces including Phuket, Phang-nga, Krabi, Ranong, Trang and Satun.2 (Figure 1) These provinces are very well-known for tourists in term of clear and beautiful beaches. Among the six provinces, Phang-nga was the most severely affected area, followed by Phuket, Ranong, Krabi, Trang and Satun.2 Phang-nga had 4,224 (78.3%) deaths, 5,597 (66.2%) injuries, 1,758 (58.8%) missing.2 
The Thai national routine disease surveillance was established since 1968. The 506 form was used as a main routine reporting form. There were 14 diseases under the surveillance in 1968 with more added as additional diseases over time.  At the present, there are 84 diseases. Most (>90%) of them are communicable diseases.  Routinely, the data are reported from 76 provinces in Thailand, all provinces of the country except Bangkok.3 
The health professionals who work as part of the surveillance system are called the Surveillance and Rapid Response Team (SRRT) and are divided into 3 levels; central, regional and local level. The SRRT was first established in 2004 for public health emergency response to conditions such as Avian Influenza A(H5N1) and Sever Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). The teams were trained focusing on surveillance system, verification of the outbreak, outbreak investigation and outbreak response. At the local level, the reports were sent from sub-district and district to provincial level. The data from locals then sent to regional and central level, respectively.4
At the time of the tsunami, national routine disease surveillance was interrupted due to the allocation of most of health personnel including, epidemiological officers, to provide emergency relief services. As a result, routine surveillance could not be carried out due to post-disaster workload. Moreover, there was no health preparedness plan for responding to a large scale natural disaster before this event. The Bureau of Epidemiology (BOE), and the Bureau of General Communicable Diseases (BGCD), Department of Disease Control (DDC), Thai Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) jointly established an active disease surveillance system for monitoring epidemic prone diseases during the post-tsunami period aiming to take action in timely manner.  Technically, the main objectives of the surveillance were to: 1) identify any diseases with epidemic potential as early as possible, and act as an effective early warning system and 2) initiate immediate investigations and timely interventions if there were any signal of a possible outbreak.

Figure 1. Map of Thailand shows Tsunami affected areas in six provinces on December 26, 2004
1.1	study objectives
The objective of this study was to describe the surveillance system that was implemented and findings from the implementation of the surveillance system. The results of the study will play a role of public health significance in guidance of surveillance development and implementation especially for post-Tsunami situation. 
2.0 	Methods
This tsunami after-action report included description of system implementation and findings of the active disease surveillance system. 
2.1	system description
Thai Ministry of Public Health established the active disease surveillance system to achieve the objectives since the second day of Tsunami occurred. An active disease surveillance system was implemented on December 27, 2004 which remained active until February 9, 2005. (Figure2)

Figure 2. Timeline from system establishment to transfer to routine surveillance system in six affected provinces, Thailand, December 26, 2004 –February 9, 2005
2.1.1	Differences between routine and active disease surveillance  





Table 1. Differences between active and routine disease surveillance system
Characteristics	Routine surveillance	Active disease surveillance
Resources	Local	Central and regional level supported local level (supplementary)
Methods of data collection	Passive collection and report by health facility personnel	Active collection by surveillance health personnel
Data collection sites	Hospitals and health centers	Hospitals, health centers, shelters and forensic centers
Data analysis	Weekly/ Monthly except emergency diseases	Daily if there were suspected outbreak- immediately
Disease items	78 diseases(at post-tsunami period)	24 diseases
Reporting forms	5 forms	3 forms
Characteristic of forms	Individual records including demographic data and risk factors of diseases	Aggregated data, daily summary, including age, nationality, ill/death but not including risk factors of diseases
Responses	Depend on disease and situation	Rapid and low threshold
Data flow 	Local to regional to central	Local to regional to central
2.1.2	Data collecting sites  
The system covered all of the affected areas including 20 districts of six provinces. All data collecting sites were composed of 1) all medical facilities including 77 health centers, 22 government hospitals, and four private hospitals, except private clinics, 2) 25 shelters for displaced people including two major shelters in Phang-nga Province, 3) two forensic identification centers, and 4) medical laboratories including one regional medical laboratory center, hospital laboratories in the region, and the Thai National Institute of Health - the high-level central laboratory facility. 
2.1.3	Disease under surveillance definitions 
Nineteen diseases of six syndromes under the surveillance were set up at the beginning of the system. Five diseases were added to the system due to concern of health professional and clinicians in affected areas. (Table 2)


Table 2. Diseases under surveillance; six syndromes and 24 diseases
Number	Syndromes	Diseases
1	Diarrheal disease 	Acute diarrheaCholeraDysenteryFood poisoning
2	Respiratory infection 	InfluenzaPneumoniaMeasles
3	Febrile syndrome 	Typhoid feverMalariaDengue Hemorrhagic Fever (DHF)Pyrexia of Unknown Origin (PUO)
4	Neurological infection 	Meningococcal meningitis
5	Jaundice 	Hepatitis
6	Others  	Viral conjunctivitisAnimal biteFever with rash*Electrical injuryChicken pox*Wound infectionENT disease*Unknown deathMumps*Sepsis/Cellulitis*Other diseases

*diseases were added to disease under surveillance during field work
The surveillance definitions of the syndromes and selected diseases were based on clinical criteria applied by local physicians. Laboratory testing was supported by the local hospitals, regional and central facilities when considered appropriate by the local physicians. The definitions of outbreaks depended on the diseases and were considered as clusters of cases by time and place distribution. In principle the areas of active disease surveillance were assigned to the six affected provinces but the actual operational areas at sub-provincial level were not rigidly defined at the beginning since degrees of disaster impact and ability of local response varied between areas and they could be modified to be suitable for specific situation in the field. 
The surveillance did not include occupational diseases and mental health diseases because there were other organizations were responsible for these diseases. 
2.1.4	Organizational management of the SRRT 
Routinely, a SRRT at local level included health professional from the district and provincial offices working with health professionals from the regional and central levels, including medical epidemiologists from BOE and BGCD. 
Each operational team was responsible for one affected province except the two provinces where there was a very small impact from the tsunami, Trang and Satun, which were combined and taken care of by a single team. Thus, five SRRT teams operating for six affected provinces. Each team composed of one commander who was one of the Directors of Regional Offices of Disease Prevention and Control, three to five medical epidemiologists who mostly were Field Epidemiology Training Program-Thailand (FETP) staffs, trainees and alumni, and six to thirteen epidemiological officers or technical officers. 
Roles and responsibilities: The SRRTs were established for routine surveillance response of the Bureau of Epidemiology, Department of Disease Control especially emerging infectious diseases outbreak, investigation and early control.4 The central, regional and local levels had their own teams. Basically, regional and central teams would support local team for both technical issues and resources when they were requested.  The team included medical epidemiologists, epidemiological personnel, health personnel and technical officers from Department of Disease Control and Office of Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Public Health (health professional at local level). For the post-tsunami situation, more than 200 health professional were mobilized from central and regional levels in SRRTs to all affected areas for supporting local level. They were divided into five teams covering all six provinces. 
Expertise of team members: The SRRTs included medical epidemiologists and other health professionals from the Bureau of General Communicable Disease and the Bureau of Epidemiology who well understood about post-disaster risks and diseases, setting the surveillance system, running the routine surveillance system, disease outbreak investigation, and data utilization for prevention and control measures. 
Team preparation and training: Before surveillance implementation, an organizational meeting was held to cover the background, objectives, how to collect data, how to use tools for data collection, guidelines for investigation, how to analyze data, how to notify the SRRT for more actions, and specific job description of each health professional. Each team, the medical epidemiologists from central level worked as the technical leaders of the team. The health professionals from the regional and local levels worked as a team members. The five provincial teams (team 1-5) were divided each into two or three smaller teams (team A, B and C) for working rotation. Team A of each province worked for seven to ten days then they switch to team B. Team B for seven to ten days and then switch to team C. There was no exact time schedule for each health professional. They worked 12-20 hours per day continuously 7-10 days before time switching. 
According to the collective agreement of central, regional and local levels, the operation was transferred back to routine surveillance by local staffs whenever they were able to run the surveillance by themselves, without extensive assistance from outside, no sign of large epidemic (no increasing trends of any diseases observed from daily surveillance reports) as well as low risk for epidemic prone disease in the shelters based on rapid environmental assessment.  
2.1.5	Equipment and supplies 
Materials included radio, mobile phones, laptops, printers, papers, laboratory test kits, media for laboratory testing, personal protective equipment or PPE (e.g., gloves, masks, etc.), Mump Measles and Rubella (MMR) vaccine, pharmaceutical materials and instruments (e.g., antibiotics such as amoxicillin), antipyretic drugs (e.g., as acetaminophen, etc.). The vehicles included cars, vans and ambulances.
2.1.6	Laboratory testing 
Laboratory testing was supported from a regional medical laboratory center, Thai National Institute of Health, with cooperation from hospitals. The laboratory results were reported directly to the SRRT in case of possible outbreak occurring and to provincial health team in parallel.
2.1.7	System operation 
Every person who came to health care facilities and met the definition of the diseases under surveillance was enrolled. There were three forms of report; data aggregated form, dead case investigation form and listing of case investigation form. These forms were prepared by medical epidemiologists at the central level and ready to use at the data collecting sites since the implementation of the SRRTs. Data collecting variables included age group (< 15 years old, ≥ 15 years old), nationality (Thai, Foreigner), gender, patient status (ill, dead) by six disease syndromes and 24 diseases. All of these diseases were under national routine surveillance system which had total of 78 diseases at that time. All of 78 diseases could not be reported timely during the post-tsunami situation, thus, the central team selected only some epidemic prone diseases to be included in the active surveillance. Additionally, these diseases were selected based on review of literature, empirical data from diseases following disasters in Thailand and other countries and previous incidence of endemic diseases in affected areas from routine surveillance system. SSRT members actively collected data from medical records and clinic log books. They copied these data to the forms, and then daily sent them to district, provincial (local) and central levels in parallel. However, they could not complete all of variable of the forms due to incomplete medical records from the hospital or mobile clinics. In the event that there were unusual cases and events, the team could early take action immediately such as a rapid environmental risk assessment (e.g., adequacy of sanitation, water quality and supply). If there were acute diarrhea cases reported from a shelter, the team verified the cases, investigated and provided recommendation for control measures as well as assessed of risk of agent contamination in that area (e.g., temporary kitchen, garbage, vehicles-fly). If there were high risks for food and water borne diseases, recommendations were made in cooperation with disease control and prevention section of the province. If there were any additional diseases of concern, they could be added to the surveillance after agreement of the daily meeting of local emergency operation center (war-room) at provincial level. This center was for coordinating and commanding amongst the team members and the team at central level. In addition, other health needs (e.g., extra staff in clinic based on their workload, equipment, drugs and vaccines) were assessed. These needs were then coordinated with the other sections in the daily meeting for strategic and logistic plan at provincial level. In the field, data were collected not only the diseases under surveillance, but also the diseases based on discussion and agreement with the people in the community, clinicians, and health workers about health related problems in their communities that should be concerned. During the visits in communities, villagers and local leaders were asked about their health needs and health care services.
In case a death was reported, for example, a death of young child with acute diarrhea, the SRRT immediately went to the community where the case lived. The case diagnosis was verified and the cause of death was investigated providing control measures and health education to the villagers. 
2.1.8	Data management 
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Figure 3. Data flow of disease surveillance data of routine surveillance and active disease surveillance
3.0 	results
3.1	Surveillance findings
For six weeks of the active disease surveillance operation, 4,816 cases were reported. Most of the reports were of diarrhea (67.9%), followed by wound infection (8.3%), and pneumonia (5.3%). (Table 3) Most of the cases were Thai in ≥15 years old group. Phuket had highest reports of events (47.2%). (Table 4) Among those events, eleven deaths were reported. All disease outbreaks included 7 food poisoning, 4 diarrhea, 1 malaria, 1 mump, 1 rubella, 1 dengue hemorrhagic fever and 1 chicken pox outbreaks. (Table 5) Among food poisoning outbreaks detected, there were three that included at least 20 cases per outbreak.  Data were collected every day, so an early outbreak could be detected within 0-3 date of onset of the first case of each outbreak. There were totally 11 cases of deaths related to the tsunami and the causes of deaths were different amongst them. (Table 6) 































Table 4. Characteristics of reported data in active disease surveillance for all affected areas (six provinces), Thailand, December 26, 2004 - February 9, 2005 (N=4,816)
Characteristics	Percentage of reported events (N=4,816)





**The data was calculated by using 3,222 (66.9%) out of 4,816 cases were classified for age group and nationality. (The system lost demographic data for 11 days.) 
Note: Trang and Satun provinces reported few events due to minimal affected areas.


Table 5. Examples of outbreak detected by active surveillance system among 6 affected provinces, December 26, 2004 – February 9, 2005
Outbreak	Place	Number of cases	Onset	Reported date	Response date
Food poisoning	Phuket	3(affected people)	12/29/04	12/29/04	12/30/04
Food poisoning	Phuket, Phang-nga	20 (villagers)	12/30/04	1/2/05	1/2/05





Table 6. Causes of deaths detected by active surveillance system among 6 affected provinces, 
December 26, 2004 – February 9, 2005 (N=11)
Number of cases	Gender 	Age (years)	Possible cause of deaths	Remarks
1	No data	A young child (no data of age year)	Severe diarrhea without treatment	-
1	Male	No data 	Diabetes mellitus with aspirated pneumonia	-
1	No data	No data 	Diabetes with diarrhea with complication	No clear data of type of complication
1	Female	76 years	Diabetes mellitus	No data of other diagnosis or complication
2	No data	No data 	Pneumonia	No other cause of death or precipitating factors
1	No 	No data 	Pyrexia of unknown origin in a child	-
1	Male	53 years 	Upper gastrointestinal hemorrhage with cellulitis with septic shock	No clear data of principle diagnosis or major cause of death or precipitating factors
2	First case: maleSecond case: no data 	First case: 53 yearsSecond case: no data of age	Septicemia 	-
1	Male	68 years	Acute renal failure with necrotizing fasciitis with septic shock with myocardial infarction	No clear data of primary cause of death or precipitating factors

3.2	outbreak detection and investigation
The mobile medical services were in the shelters. The health centers were normally located at the center of the communities. Thus, the villagers could access to health care easily and the SRRTs could collect the data for the surveillance system easily. The findings did not show any serious diseases such as cholera and meningococcemia. A rubella case was detected from unofficial source, a health volunteer, though the official medical report did not detect the case.
If a suspected outbreak was met the criteria of investigation, the investigation was conducted as soon as possible and action was taken to control the outbreak on the same day of receiving report. For example, food poisoning cases was reported in a shelter.  The cases were investigated on the same day by SRRT.  They found that the source of this food poisoning outbreak was Garoupa fish. According to this finding, the information was sent to health authorities to prohibit consumption of Garoupa fish from the Andaman Sea because consumption would result in the development of ciguatera disease (unpublished data). 
3.3	Usage of surveillance findings
Several environmental prevention and control measures were taken at the shelters or in the communities as routine prevention measures (e.g., vaccination, vector control, and food and water sanitation) by control and prevention team of provincial level. Additionally, the data from the environment assessment of the community and control measures was available for decision making. For example, a SRRT identified a group at high risk of measles, the Morgan (Andaman costal ethnic minority), children who were rarely covered by routine immunization program. In this instance, MMR vaccines were provided to those Morgan children in the shelters. Thus, no any cases of measles were detected from the shelters.
At the local level, the surveillance information triggered investigations of epidemic prone diseases. Additionally, this information led to release public health education, control vectors of Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever (DHF) and Malaria, provide MMR vaccination, improve sanitation in the shelters (such as latrine improvement, food preparation), and study health related problems (such as wound infection and occupational injury). At the central level, this information was used for health education distribution through press release, websites, posters and brochures for populations in shelters, affected areas and surrounded communities. Moreover, the Ministry of Public Health made policy decision based on this information such as allocation of resources; money, human, and materials to the affected areas.  
3.4	Flexibility of diseases under the surveillance system
Even though before starting the surveillance data collection forms and disease lists developed by staff of the central level were used, they were changed in the field. For instance, during implementation the surveillance system, the number diseases under surveillance increased from 19 to 24 diseases because there were additional diseases concerned clinicians, community or health personnel from central level.  On December 30, 2004, aspirated pneumonia and sepsis/cellulitis were added in due to high possibility of drowning from tsunami and high reports of wounds and injuries in the affected areas, respectively. However, aspirated pneumonia was cut off later because there were very few cases reports. For example, on January 4, 2005, fever with rash and chicken pox because there were reports of these diseases which were high possibility to spread in the shelters or communities. In addition, Eye Nose and Throat (ENT) disease and mumps were added in because there was increase of otitis media reports and there was a case report of mumps in a shelter on January 8 and 15, 2005, respectively. (Table 7)


Table 7. Changes of diseases under active disease surveillance
Date of Changes 	Number of diseases, syndromes	Diseases changes	Reasons of changes
December 27, 2004	19  disease, 6 syndromes 	-	-
December 30, 2004	21 disease, 6 syndromes	- Added aspirated pneumonia, sepsis/ cellulitis	- Aspirated pneumonia:Possibility of increase of aspirated pneumonia due to drowning cases reports- Sepsis/Cellulitis: Increase of wounds and injuries High possibility of not receiving treatment of wounds properly 
January 4, 2005	22 disease, 6 syndromes	- Removed Aspirated pneumonia out- Added in Fever with rash, Chicken pox	- Few cases of aspirated pneumonia - Finding fever with rash and chicken pox which having highly transmitted in the shelters/communities
January 8, 2005	23 disease, 6 syndromes	Added in Eye Nose and Throat (ENT) 	Increase of Otitis media reports
January 15, 2005	24 disease, 6 syndromes	Added in Mumps 	Finding of Mumps in a shelter
3.5	incomplete data collection
Some medical records from shelters, mobile health services and health centers were incomplete, therefore, health professional could not complete all data in the forms of the active disease surveillance. Additionally, there were different patterns of data collection in different sites of different teams. Some provinces; such as Phuket, collected data from all districts of the province, but some provinces; such as Phang-nga, collected only affected areas.
3.6	ending of active surveillance system
Provinces with minor impact of the tsunami (Trang and Satun Province) were transferred to the routine surveillance in one week after implementation because of minimal affected works. Moderately affected provinces (Krabi, Ranong, and Phuket Province) were transferred to the routine surveillance system in four weeks, and the most affected provinces (Phang-nga Province) was transferred in six weeks. The different duration of the disease surveillance depend on how much the national routine surveillance system at each province was affected by the tsunami. However, no exact dates of ending the system were set at the beginning of implementation.
4.0 	Discussion
4.1	Surveillance findings and outbreak detection
Acute diarrhea was the disease most commonly reported. It was defined as food and water borne disease which were a significant problem of post-tsunami situation which, was consistent with findings from other post-tsunami, was consistent with findings disaster situation. 5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12 A number of cases of wound infection reflects an important problem of post-tsunami injuries.13  
4.2	Usage of surveillance data
The system could estimate morbidity and mortality of epidemic prone and could characterize the population only by age group, gender, and nationality. The case reports of the system were not collected as individual record from the clinics or health centers. Thus, these available variables was not sufficient to identify epidemiological linkage or risk factors of the diseases.  However, the data could be used to identify a suspected outbreak if a high number of cases are identified. 
Even though the active surveillance system could not show the exact number of the cases, death, and post-tsunami outbreaks, it could be estimated magnitude of the diseases, trend of diseases and health related problems. This was very important for policy making decision and management resources during such urgent situation.
4.3	timely outbreak detection and investigation
Active data collection, health problems analyzed daily at data collection sites could help early detection and response, although the passive reported numbers of cases and deaths did not show the possible outbreak at that time. The findings of a relatively small number of outbreaks and no serious events detected from the system supported that the system is useful for aiming early outbreak detection and timely manner.  
4.4	flexibility of diseases under the surveillance
There were a large number of wound infection cases. Therefore, in the future it may be useful for clinicians to develop appropriate treatment guideline for this specific situation. 
World Health Organization (WHO) did not recommend tetanus and tuberculosis to be included as the diseases under surveillance.14,15  In the future, tetanus should be considered to be added to the surveillance system because there were many cases of wound infection which could lead to tetanus. Even though the incubation period of tetanus is quite long (3–21 days), tetanus should be the disease under the surveillance because it was a serious and preventable disease. However, it was concerned by health professional due to administering tetanus toxoid for those who met criteria in this post-tsunami period.13 Additionally, the post-tsunami situation was an optimal condition for tuberculosis due to crowded people and poor air ventilation.5,14 It should be included in the system even though the current system could not detect any cases of tuberculosis. In this case, tuberculosis cases might not be detected by the active surveillance because of a short time of surveillance while long incubation period (2-12 weeks) of tuberculosis. 
Other serious diseases, such as cholera and meningococcemia, which the WHO recommend to be the diseases under surveillance, were not detected.14,15 
In summary, serious diseases, especially highly contagious disease or highly epidemic prone diseases (e.g., tetanus, tuberculosis, cholera and meningococcemia) should be included in the surveillance even though there were no case reporting. In addition, to monitor the diseases with long incubation period of time (such as tetanus and tuberculosis), the surveillance system should cover at least 12 weeks or they should be transferred to the national routine surveillance with special monitoring.
The definitions of diseases under surveillance were flexible which provided advantages of working in the communities. However, these led to inconsistent data due to different patterns of data collection in different sites by different teams. This was the major bias of the data of the system.
4.5	incomplete data collection and insufficient data
The system could not clearly show whether the number of cases were higher than those number in the normal situation. Even though Phang-nga was the most affected area, it was not the area with the highest reporting. Phuket team reported from all health facilities but Phang-nga reported from only health facilities of affected area. Therefore, the different number of reports of disease may have been caused by different criteria of data collection and reporting. Across these teams differences are due to the flexibility of the system. Moreover, the various and different patterns of health-care seeking among affected population might be a cause of higher number of cases in some areas. 
The data outputs of the system were aggregated data, thus, data could not be traced back to sources of outbreak or risk factors of the outbreak. In addition, due to incomplete medical records and data collection, there may have been insufficient information to detect outbreak. Moreover, the rate of morbidity and mortality could not be calculated because necessary variables; such as population at risk of the affected area, were not collected. These were the limitation of this surveillance system..
4.6	system establishment
The surveillance system was able to be established on the second day after the tsunami and covered all affected areas. This was very early for establishment the new surveillance system which showed the strength of organization and resource allocation of Thai public health system.
4.7	system organization
All health facilities, both government and private, should be included as data collecting sites to reduce information bias of the system. According to the emergency situation of the post-tsunami period, there were many people moved into the affected area for humanitarian relieves. The definition of population at risk (e.g., rescuers, emergency relief volunteers, directly affected people, local people, etc.), should be clearly defined prior to the initiation of a surveillance system.  This would be another key point of reducing information bias in the system. 
The SRRTs from the central and regional levels were rapidly recruited from the existing surveillance system. This made the system run well because the staff had experiences with surveillance system. Regarding the skills in outbreak detection and verification, the SRRTs from central and regional levels could temporarily reduce a deficit of man power. In addition, this strategy supported the local staff which could not run the routine surveillance because they were directly affected by the tsunami (e.g., loss of family members and colleagues). The skills of the SRRTs, especially in outbreak detection and investigation, was the strength of the system and is likely to achieve the objectives of the system. 
Although there were differences between the routine and active disease surveillance, the system run well due to the simplicity of the active system. The system was simple to run due to a structure similar to that of the national system, including data collection, verification and the investigation of the outbreaks. This proved to be an advantage of the system since it permitted the system to be rapidly established and implemented. 
4.8	Ending of the system
The transferring of the active surveillance to the national routine surveillance system was not well planned. Thus, there were differences of period of time of conducting the emergency surveillance in each province. The lack of a prompt indication of transferring to the standard national system was not planned at the beginning of the implementation of the emergency system. This caused incomplete reports of both systems in overlapped time period. As a result, the systems could not be used for comparing the number of cases to detect trends of diseases.  
Active surveillance had many advantages in this situation. It achieved all of objectives of the system establishment including identification of epidemic prone diseases and initiation of immediate investigations and timely intervention. However, there were several limitations of the system. The information bias of the data collection was the major problem. This included incomplete data collection, aggregated data collection, not well-defined risk groups of people in the system, and not-well defined the data collecting sites. There were no documents for important strategies such as indication for the termination of the emergency system and a transfer to the national system.
5.0 	conclusion




List of acronyms in this essay.
Table 8. Acronyms of this essay
Acronym	Name
ANU	The Australian National University
DDPM	Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation 
SRRT	Surveillance and Rapid Response Team 
SARS	Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
BOE	Bureau of Epidemiology
BGCD	Bureau of General Communicable Diseases
DDC	Department of Disease Control
MOPH	Ministry of Public Health




PUO	Pyrexia of Unknown Origin
ENT	Eye Nose and Throat
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